Oct 20, Elia Mantovani rated it liked it. The book provides a very good genetal introduction to some central debates at the core of political philosophy. Most of the essay can works as a sum of the thoughts of many great phiilosophers i. The book is generally fine, absolutely not too technical, but I found Wolff's style excessively manual. It may serve as a handbook rather than as a traditi The book provides a very good genetal introduction to some central debates at the core of political philosophy.
It may serve as a handbook rather than as a traditional essay. A very interesting and accessible introductory work. The book not only gives an overview of the powerhouses of political philosophy Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke etc and their landmark theories, but posses many questions about the state, justice and rights, etc to the reader, which I myself had previously never considered.
As much as I hated getting assigned a page reading for one week of uni plus another 80 page reading, and an assignment , this was actually incredibly enjoyable.
Not only was it really fascinating, and covered quite a number of people and ideas, it was well-written, paced and thought out. Feb 02, Jacob Thorington rated it really liked it. Very good intro to political philosophy. It's got a great deal of good material. Sadly, there's no Thomas Paine. Aug 31, Hannah rated it liked it. I was impressed by the lucidity and rigour of this writer's explanation.
It favoured well compared to the other writing on my course reading list. Notes - Hobbes sees humans as always in search of something, never at rest - Human beings are constantly fighting a war, because of this everyone is fighting in self defence, even taking pre-emptive action. Everything can be justified. Not the same thing as a right to self defence. Isn't a state just the result of this cooperation over time? Condorcet pointed out that if we assume that people, on average, have a better than average chance of gettingt he right answer, then allowing majority decision turns out to be a near certain way of getting the right result.
Creating a negative externality is often a way of dumping costs on another. Aug 02, Dave Elliott rated it it was amazing Shelves: philosophy , politics. Hi there, I think that this book will appeal to both the person just becoming interested in why is it we are organised the way that we are, the person beginning to study politics and philosophy and the person that has any interest in the world, where we have been, where we are now and how that journey has been made.
It is written in such a clear and "simple" way that it draws you in to find yourself almost unable to put it down. If you have read anything else written by Jonathan Wolff, I think you Hi there, I think that this book will appeal to both the person just becoming interested in why is it we are organised the way that we are, the person beginning to study politics and philosophy and the person that has any interest in the world, where we have been, where we are now and how that journey has been made.
If you have read anything else written by Jonathan Wolff, I think you will immediately understand what I mean by that. For those of you not familiar with Wolff, if you can imagine not having to struggle with unneeded, esoteric language but instead being treated to straightforward, clear words and phrases that explain these sometimes complex thoughts and situations in a way that just make sense, then you understand the sort of wonderful experience this book is.
Wolff's writing style, whilst making it easy to read, never detracts from the import of what he is talking about. You are never left thinking "I'm sure there's more to this than just that! Of course, this is an introduction and so the author doesn't go into the minutiae of every topic but it is covered to a degree that you feel satisfied that you could either pick up one of the cited references and be able to grapple with the concept therein or pick up the recommended reading having a good understanding to get straight into it.
This is a great book. Easy to read and understand with content that is well-chosen, thought out and presented. I can't recommend this book highly enough. Jun 29, Rasheed Lewis rated it it was amazing Recommends it for: any citizen of any country. Shelves: introduction , philosophy , politics. As Thomas Jefferson noted, "An educated citizenry is a vital requisite for our survival as a free people. How can we expect to take full advantage of our current "unalienable rights" while failing to be cognizant of the Great Conversation that has gotten us here.
After becoming acutely aware of my own ignorance in As Thomas Jefferson noted, "An educated citizenry is a vital requisite for our survival as a free people. After becoming acutely aware of my own ignorance in politics, I figured I'd pick Jonathan Wolff's book up. And wow, all of the questions presented in this small but productive introductory book made me regret most of the times I had decided to drop by unfounded two cents into the pool of public social media discussion.
From John Stuart Mill and his wariness of group identities to Rawls and Nozick's debate on the trade-offs between liberty and security, Wolff's examples are especially fitting for the discussions of the day.
Do your part as a citizen and read it. If you are looking for a great book to introduce you to the subject of political Philosophy, this is a great option. Short and very informative on the subjects that it covers. It might be helpful to come in with somewhat of an understanding of the history of political thought because he deals a lot with philosophers such as Hobbs, Locke, Rousseau, Rawls, and others. Overall a good If you are looking for a great book to introduce you to the subject of political Philosophy, this is a great option.
Overall a good book. A difficult book to read in a row, which, as the author advises in the beginning, is not necessarily the best way to do it. Each chapter can be read at a different time, and refers to a different stream of political though, answering one of the three questions posed throughout the book. As a result, I now have more questions than answers, which I guess was the A difficult book to read in a row, which, as the author advises in the beginning, is not necessarily the best way to do it.
As a result, I now have more questions than answers, which I guess was the point of it all. A very nice introduction to political philosophy. The book chapters are focused more in broad topics of relevance to political philosophy than in a historical survey of ideas. The interesting part is that, while examining these topics, the author also provides an account of some of the important philosophers whose ideas have represented major contributions to political philosophy.
A nice starting book to anyone interested in the study of political philosophy. May 28, Jonas Peeters rated it really liked it. Albeit dense, the books gives an amazing introduction in political philosphy. However, I do feel that the books was heavily influenced by Anglo-Saxon thinkers and more continental approaches not covered. He spoke a bare minimum about Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and other continental thinkers such as Max Weber and Hegel where left largely untouched.
Besides this overwhelming Anglo-Saxon undertone, the books warrants its pages. Nov 21, tongla rated it liked it. Good and concise critical introduction to political philosophy.
I have no problems with professors presenting their own arguments, as long as they do it to the extent that students are encouraged to think. Wolff did this well, except in the last chapter on feminism where I think the counterarguments are a bit too simplistic and some feminist claims are too hastily dismissed.
I read the 2nd edition, though; the latest edition may have improved on this. Works fine as an introduction, but for the most part stays pretty firmly within the realm of liberalism, with the exception of some communitarianism, a bit of Marx, and Nozick's anarchism coming through. I wish it would have delved more into the rich diversity of political thought, rather than focusing so much on Mill and Locke.
Nov 01, Faisal Shabbir rated it really liked it. Excellent introduction to political philosophy. Written in a manner easy to read. Worth a read to understand difficult concepts and developing the journey of political philosophy through time admittedly, in Europe only.
It also helps give reasons we need political philosophy and issues it helps us conceptulise. Nov 14, Michiel rated it really liked it. Very good introduction in the topic, for those without background in political science and even philosophy, like me.
The upside of this book is also its downside; it's relatively short. While the book covers a broad scope, it does not go greatly in depth. But this does allow amateurs like me to grasp the topic relatively quickly and gives plenty of pointers to continue your study. Jan 23, Dougie Whitehead rated it it was amazing. An Incredibly important, and extremely readable, book outlining the threads of political thought from Plato to today.
Rights natural and created , Liberty, who gets to rule, Justice, free markets, distributive wealth, communitarianism, and Individualism. Only a starting point for more reading.
But a wonderful starting point! And admittedly a textbook for a class I am starting in April. Aug 04, Ahmed rated it it was amazing. An excellent introduction for the absolute beginner to political philosophy which, despite recognizing its own implicit bias towards individualist liberalism in the final chapter, still aims more towards asking questions than giving answers in order to elucidate the problems which thinkers of political philosophy generally concern themselves with and how they approach them.
Nov 06, Erik rated it it was ok. Reviews made me think this would be a simple overview of political philosophy. But I still found it dense and largely hard to follow. Biggest takeaway is whether people should make decisions based on their individual needs or societal needs -- and disagreement over what those needs are. Jun 15, Nanami rated it really liked it. It was a lot of information at once, but a good introduction nonetheless. This is a masterful review of the most significant philosophical thoughts since Hobbs, carefully looking at pros, cons and ramifications of each theory.
Although a bit too much time is spent reviewing Mill and Rawls, this is a must-read for all early readers of political philosophy. Readers also enjoyed. History and Politics. Social Science. About Jonathan Wolff. Jonathan Wolff. He is the secretary of the British Philosophical Association and honorary secretary of the Aristotelian Society, which publishes Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Recently, Wolff's work has specialized in disadvantage Jonathan Wolff is a Professor specialising in political philosophy at University College London, in England.
Recently, Wolff's work has specialized in disadvantage and equality and public policy decision making. Books by Jonathan Wolff. When Dana Schwartz started writing about a 19th-century pandemic ravaging Edinburgh in her latest book, Anatomy: A Love Story, she had no idea Read more Trivia About An Introduction t No trivia or quizzes yet. Add some now ». This is no bad thing. The last thing I want to do is to present the illusion of a finished or completed subject, or even one that is straightforward to chart.
Too many introductory books give the impression that the area of study was created by decree, and that understanding is a matter of mastering the manual or rule book.
I have tried to avoid this type of over-simplification. The book is written so that each chapter develops a theme arising from the previous one, but I also hope that any of the chapters can be read as a self-standing unit, as an introduction to a particular issue. Readers often feel that they have virtually a moral obligation to start at the beginning of any book and read it page by page my grandmother used to say that Hitler would always read the last page of a book first.
In the case of this book the reader is hereby invited to follow his or her own interests. Indeed, I have managed to amass an almost indecent amount of help and advice for such a short book. I am very grateful to them all. Pericles' funeral oration, in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, It has been said that there are only two questions in political philosophy; 'who gets what?
The first of these questions is about the distribution of material goods, and of rights and liberties. On what basis should people possess property? What rights and liberties should they enjoy? The second question concerns the distribution of another good: political power.
Locke defined political power as 'the right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties'. This probably goes further than we need, but we can see the point.
Political power includes the right to command others, and to subject them to punishment if they disobey. Who should hold this power? As soon as we reflect on these questions puzzles emerge. Is there any good reason why one person should have more property than another?
Are there any justified limits to my liberty? And what should the relation be between political power and economic success? In some countries few obtain political power unless they are already wealthy. In others, those who gain political power soon find themselves rich. But should there be any connection at all between possession of wealth and enjoyment of political power?
Indeed, political power is puzzling enough on its own. If someone has legitimate political power over me then they have the right to force me to do certain things. But how could another person justify the claim to have such rights over me? It often seems outrageous that someone else should tell me what to do, worse still that they think they are entitled to punish me if I disobey. Yet there is, of course, another side to this. Reflecting on this, perhaps there is something to be said, after all, for the existence of political power.
So we can identify with both the anarchist's plea for the autonomy of the individual, and the authoritarian's claims for the power of the state. One task for the political philosopher, then, is to determine the correct balance between autonomy and authority, or, in other words, to determine the proper distribution of political power.
This example also illustrates what is distinctive about political philosophy. Political philosophy is a normative discipline, meaning that it tries to establish norms rules or ideal standards. We can contrast the normative with the descriptive. Descriptive studies attempt to find out how things are. Normative studies try to discover how things should be: what is right, just, or morally correct.
Politics can be studied from both a descriptive and a normative standpoint. Characteristically, descriptive political studies are undertaken by the political scientist, the sociologist, and the historian. So, for example, some political scientists ask questions about the actual distribution of goods within a given society. Who in the United States of America holds wealth? Who in Germany holds power? The political philosopher, like all of us, has good reason to be interested in the answers to these questions, but his or her primary concern is elsewhere: what rule or principle should govern the distribution of goods?
The political philosopher will ask, not 'how is property distributed? The partition between normative and descriptive studies, though, is not quite as clear-cut as it might seem.
Consider again the question 'who holds wealth? Primarily because the distribution of wealth is relevant to normative questions about justice. Compare the question: 'who holds string? And, of course, factual questions about human behaviour are just as relevant to normative issues.
For example, there is no point in putting forward a theory of the just society without having some knowledge of human behaviour and motivation. Some theories of justice, for example, might make unrealistic assumptions about people's capacity or lack of capacity for altruism. In short, studying how things are helps to explain how things can be, and studying how they can be is indispensable for assessing how they ought to be.
But how can we answer the question of how things ought to be? We know, broadly, how to go about answering purely descriptive questions: we go and look. This is not to say that political science or history is easy, for very subtle and detailed work is often involved.
But in principle we do think we know how to do it, even if often we cannot find the information we seek. But what can we do to find out how things ought to be? Where can we look? The uncomfortable fact is that there is no easy answer. But, despite this, very many philosophers have attempted to solve these normative political problems, and they have not been short of things to say.
We will examine some of the most important contributions throughout this book, and we will see that, by and large, philosophers reason about politics in just the way they do about other philosophical issues. They draw distinctions, they examine whether propositions are self-contradictory, or whether two or more propositions are logically consistent. They try to show that surprising theses can be deduced from more obvious ones. In short, they present arguments. And philosophers argue about politics for good reason.
In political philosophy, unlike many other areas of philosophy, there is no hiding-place. In philosophy, agnosticism 'the English translate their ignorance into Greek and call it agnosticism', said Engels is often a respectable position. Perhaps I cannot find a satisfactory position on the question of whether or not we have free will, so I profess no view. In a wider context this hardly matters. But in political philosophy agnosticism is self-defeating.
It may not matter if a society has no official policy on the solution to the problem of free will, but in every society someone or no one holds political power, and property is distributed in some way or other. But potentially we all have some say, if not by voting then by making our views known through debate and discussion, whether on the public stage, or by 'underground' means.
Those who prefer not to participate will find their political decisions made for them, whether they like it or not. To say or do nothing is, in practice, to endorse the present situation, however repellent.
In the course of this book we shall raise and discuss the main questions of political philosophy, examining some of the most influential answers, from the ancient Greeks to the present day. Each chapter takes on a particular question or controversy. The natural starting-point is political power, the right to command. Why should some have the right to pass laws to regulate the behaviour of others?
Well, suppose no one had such a right. What would life be like? This is the question pursued in the first chapter: what would happen in a 'state of nature' without government?
Would life be unbearable? Or an improvement on how things are now? Suppose we come to accept that life under government is preferable to life in the state of nature. Does it follow from this that we have the moral duty to do as the state decrees? Or is there another argument that will deliver this conclusion? This is the problem of political obligation, which we shall discuss in Chapter 2.
If we have a state, how should it be organized? Should it be democratic? What does it even mean to say that the state is democratic? Is there any rationale for preferring rule by the people to rule by an expert: a benevolent dictator?
These are the questions pursued in Chapter 3. How much power should the state have? Or, viewed from the other side, how much liberty should the citizen enjoy? Chapter 4 considers the theory that, to avoid the 'tyranny of the majority', we should be given the liberty to act just as we wish, provided that we do no harm to others.
If we give citizens such liberty, should this include the liberty to acquire and dispose of property however they see fit? Or are there justified restrictions on economic activity in the name of liberty or justice? This is the topic of Chapter 5: distributive justice. The five main chapters of this book take us through topics of enduring concern: the state of nature, the state, democracy, liberty, and property.
By this point, with two and a half thousand years of hindsight, we may have some sort of answer to a question raised, yet not satisfactorily answered, in this Introduction— how do we do political philosophy? On this topic, as on all those discussed here, my aim is not to force an opinion on you; I hope instead to present some materials that will help you form your own view. Of course it will be possible to read this book and end up as uncertain as before. But we must not underestimate the progress made by advancing from muddled ignorance to informed bemusement.
Jolly good show. Like the Coral Island. Ballantyne's Coral Island is a story in which three English boys are marooned on a desert island. Through courage, intelligence, and cooperation they repel pirates and native savages to enjoy an idyllic life in the South Seas. William Golding's characters also find themselves on a bountiful coral island, but soon fall first into dispute, and then into desperate tribal warfare.
In telling their stories as they do, Ballantyne and Golding suggest opposing pictures in answer to our first question: what would life be like in a 'natural' state, a world without government? Why ask this question? What is its relevance for political philosophy? We take for granted that we live in a world of political institutions: central government, local government, the police, the law courts. These institutions distribute and administer political power. They place people in offices of responsibility, and these people then claim to have the right to command us to act in various ways.
And, if we disobey and are caught, we will be punished. This level of interference in our lives can seem intolerable. But what is the alternative?
A natural starting-point for thinking about the state is to ask: what would things be like without it? To understand why we have something, it is often a good tactic to consider its absence.
Of course, we could hardly abolish the state just to find out what life would be like without it, so the best we can do in practice is carry out this process as a thought- experiment. We imagine a 'state of nature'; a situation where no state exists and no one possesses political power. Then we try to decide what it would be like to live under those conditions. This way we can come to a view about how things would be without the state, and this, we hope, will help us to see just why we have a state.
Perhaps we will come to understand how the state is justified, if it is, and also what form it should take.
Was there ever a state of nature? Many philosophers seem reluctant to commit themselves on this topic. Jean-Jacques Rousseau , for example, thought that so much time would have been required to pass from a state of nature to 'civil society' a society governed by a formal state that it would be blasphemous to assume that modern societies had arisen in this way. He argued that the amount of time needed for the transition was longer than the age of the world, as recorded in the scriptures.
Yet, on the other hand, Rousseau also believed that there were contemporary examples of peoples living in a state of nature, while John Locke thought this was true of many groups living in seventeenth-century America.
But even if there never has been a true state of nature we can still consider the question of what life would be like if, hypothetically, we found ourselves without a state. Thomas Hobbes , deeply worried by the English Civil War, thought he saw his country falling into a state of nature. In Leviathan he drew a picture of how unpleasant this would be, hoping to persuade his readers of the advantages of government.
Accordingly, for the purposes of this chapter we need not spend much time discussing the question of whether, as a matter of fact, human beings have ever lived in a state of nature. All we need to argue is that it is possible. Is it possible? On this view, the state exists naturally in the sense of being natural to human beings. Maybe we would not be human beings if we lived in a society without a state.
Perhaps we would be a lower form of animal. If human beings exist, then so does the state. If this is true then speculation about the state of nature is redundant. In response some theorists claim that we have plenty of evidence that human beings have been able to live without the state, and such claims have been vital to the case made by anarchist writers we will return to these later in the chapter.
But even if human beings have never actually lived for any length of time without a state, it is very hard to see how it could be established that it is absolutely impossible. And so, as a way of trying to work out why we have the state, we will assume that human beings could find themselves in a world without it.
What would that world be like? Hobbes In [the state of nature] there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing of things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Hobbes's greatest work, Leviathan published in , pursues a theme that had obsessed him for more than twenty years: the evils of civil war and the anarchy by which it would be accompanied. Nothing could be worse than life without the protection of the state, Hobbes argued, and therefore strong government is essential to ensure that we do not lapse into the war of all against all.
But why did Hobbes believe that the state of nature would be so desperate, a state of war, a state of constant fear and danger of a violent death?
The essence of Hobbes's view is that, in the absence of government, human nature will inevitably bring us into severe conflict. Hobbes suggests that there are two keys to the understanding of human nature. One is self-knowledge. Honest introspection tells us a great deal about what human beings are like: the nature of their thoughts, hopes, and fears.
The other is knowledge of the general principles of physics. Just as to understand the citizen the individual in political society you have to understand human nature; Hobbes believed, as a materialist, that to understand human nature you must first understand 'body' or matter, of which, he urged, we are entirely composed.
For our purposes, the most important aspect of Hobbes's account of matter is his adoption of Galileo's principle of the conservation of motion. Prior to Galileo, philosophers and scientists had been puzzled by the question of what kept objects in motion.
By what mechanism, for example, does a cannon-ball remain in flight once it has been fired? Galileo's revolutionary answer was to say that this was the wrong question.
We should assume that objects will continue to travel at a constant motion and direction until acted on by another force. What needs to be explained is not why things keep going, but why they change direction and why they stop. In Hobbes's lifetime this view was still a novelty, and, he pointed out, defied the common-sense thought that, just as we tire and seek rest after moving, objects will naturally do this too.
But the truth, he claims, is that 'when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it' Leviathan, This, he thought, was true for us too. Becoming tired and desiring rest is simply to have a different motion act upon us. So the principle of the conservation of motion was used by Hobbes in developing a materialist, mechanist view of human beings.
The broad outlines of this account are laid out in the introduction to Leviathan: 'What is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body. Thus human beings are animated through motion. Sensation, for example, is a 'pressing' on an organ. Imagination is a 'decaying relic' of sensation. A desire is an 'internal motion towards an object'. All of this is meant quite literally. Human beings, Hobbes argues, seek what he calls 'felicity', continual success in achieving the objects of desire.
It is the search to secure felicity that will bring us to war in the state of nature. Ultimately, Hobbes thought, our fear of death would bring human beings to create a state.
But without a state, in the state of nature, Hobbes thought that the search for felicity would lead to a war of all against all. Why did Hobbes think this? One clue can be found in Hobbes's definition of power: one's 'present means to obtain some future apparent Good' Leviathan, So to be assured of achieving felicity one must become powerful.
Sources of power, Hobbes claims, include riches, reputations, and friends, and human beings have 'a restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death' Leviathan, This is not only because humans can never reach a state of complete satisfaction, but also because a person 'cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more' Leviathan, For others will also seek to increase their power, and so the search for power, is by its nature, competitive.
Everyone's natural, continual, attempt to increase power—to have riches and people under one's command—will lead to competition. But competition is not war. So why should competition in the state of nature lead to war? An important further step is Hobbes's assumption that human beings are by nature 'equal'.
An assumption of natural equality is often used in political and moral philosophy as a basis for the argument that we should respect other people, treating one another with care and concern. But for Hobbes the assumption is put to a quite different use, as we might suspect when we see how he states the point: we are equal in that all humans possess roughly the same level of strength and skill, and so any human being has the capacity to kill any other.
To this Hobbes adds the reasonable assumption that in the state of nature there is a scarcity of goods, so that two people who desire the same kind of thing will often desire to possess the same thing.
Whatever I possess, others may desire, and so I must constantly be on my guard. Yet even if I possess nothing I cannot be free from fear. Others may take me to be a threat to them and so I could easily end up the victim of a pre-emptive strike. From these assumptions of equality, scarcity, and uncertainty, it follows, thinks Hobbes, that the state of nature will be a state of war: From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthe- lesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.
And from hence it comes to pass, that where an Invader hath no more to feare than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty.
And the Invader again is in the like danger of another. Leviathan, Worse still, Hobbes argues, people seek not only the means of immediate satisfaction, but also power in order to satisfy whatever future desires they will have. Now, as reputation of power is power, some people will attack others, even those who pose no threat, purely to gain a reputation of strength as a means of future protection.
As in the school playground, those with a reputation for winning fights are least likely to be attacked for their goods, and may even have goods surrendered to them by others who feel unable to defend themselves.
Of course, those with a reputation for strength cannot relax either: they are the most likely victims of those seeking to enhance their own reputations. In sum, Hobbes sees three principal reasons for attack in the state of nature: for gain, for safety to pre-empt invaders , and for glory or reputation. At bottom, Hobbes relies on the idea that human beings, in the search for felicity, constantly try to increase their power their present means to obtain future goods.
When we add that human beings are roughly equal in strength and ability; that desired goods are scarce; and that no one can be sure that they will not be invaded by others, it seems reasonable to conclude that rational human action will make the state of nature a battlefield.
The motive to attack falls into place when we also recognize that attacking others in the state of nature is often the surest way of getting or keeping what you want. Should it be objected that this depiction of our likely plight in the state of nature relies on an assumption that human beings are unrealistically cruel, or unrealistically selfish? But Hobbes would reply that both objections miss the point.
Human beings, Hobbes argues, are not cruel, 'that any man should take pleasure in other mens great harms, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible' Leviathan, As for selfishness, he would agree that human beings do generally, if not always, seek to satisfy their self-centred desires. But of equal or greater importance as a source of war is fear: the fear that others around you may try to take from you what you have. This can lead you to attack; not for gain, but for safety or perhaps even reputation.
Thus we come close to the idea of a war in which everyone is fighting everyone else in self-defence. Still, it might be said, it is unreasonable to suppose that everyone will be so suspicious of each other that they will always be at each others' throats.
But Hobbes accepts that there will be moments without actual conflict. He defines the state of war not as constant fighting, but as a constant readiness to fight, so that no one can relax and let down their guard. Is he right that we should be so suspicious? Why not assume that people in the state of nature will adopt the motto 'live and let live'?
But consider, says Hobbes, how we live even under the authority of the state. What opinion of your neighbours do you express when you lock your doors against them? And of other members of your household when you lock your chests and drawers? If we are so suspicious when we live with the protection of law, just think how afraid we would be in the state of nature. At this point it might be argued that, while Hobbes has told us an amusing story, he has overlooked one thing: morality.
Although creatures with no moral sense might behave as Hobbes outlines, we are different. The great majority of us accept that we should not attack other people or take their property.
Of course in a state of nature a minority would steal and kill, as they do now, but there would be enough people with a moral sense to stop the rot spreading and prevent the immoral minority from bringing us to a general war. This objection raises two central questions. First, does Hobbes believe that we can make sense of the ideas of morality in a state of nature?
Let us consider Hobbes's position on the first of these questions. Hobbes seems to deny that there can be a morality in the state of nature: 'To this warre of every man against every man. The argument Hobbes uses at this point is that injustice consists of the breach of some law, but for a law to exist there must be a lawgiver, a common power, able to enforce that law.
In the state of nature there is no common power, so no law, so no breach of law, and so no injustice. Each person has 'the Liberty Leviathan, One of the consequences of this, claims Hobbes, is that 'in such a condition every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body' Leviathan, Hobbes calls the liberty to act as you think fit to preserve yourself the 'right of nature': its consequence seems to be that, in the state of nature, you are permitted to do anything, even take another's life, if you believe that this will help you survive.
Why does Hobbes take such an extreme position, granting everyone liberty to do anything they think fit in the state of nature? But perhaps his position is not so extreme. We would find it hard to disagree that people in the state of nature have the right to defend themselves. That said, it also seems evident that individuals must decide for themselves what reasonably counts as a threat to them, and further, what is the most appropriate action to take in the face of such a threat.
No one, it would seem, could reasonably be criticized for any action they take to defend themselves. As pre-emption is a form of defence, invading others can often be seen as the most rational form of self-protection. This, then, is the simple initial account of Hobbes's view. In the state of nature there is no justice or injustice, no right or wrong.
Moral notions have no application. This is what Hobbes calls the 'Natural Right of Liberty'. But as we shall see, Hobbes's view does have further complications. In addition to the Natural Right of Liberty, Hobbes also argues that what he calls the 'Laws of Nature' also exist in the state of nature.
A second law instructs us to give up our right to all things, provided others are willing as well, and each should 'be contented with as much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe' Leviathan, The third, which is particularly important for Hobbes's later social contract argument for the state, is to perform whatever covenants you make.
In fact, Hobbes spells out a total of nineteen Laws of Nature, concerning justice, property, gratitude, arrogance, and other matters of moral conduct. All these laws, Hobbes supposes, can be deduced from the fundamental law, although he realizes that few people would be able to carry out the deduction, for most people 'are too busie getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand' Leviathan, But the Laws of Nature can be 'contracted into one easy sum Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe', a negative formulation of the biblical 'golden rule' do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
The Laws of Nature, then, could easily be called a moral code. But if Hobbes intends these as a set of moral rules which govern the state of nature, then this seems to contradict his earlier statement that there is no right or wrong in such a condition. Furthermore, if people are motivated to obey the moral law perhaps this will make the state of nature rather more peaceful than Hobbes allows.
However, Hobbes does not describe the Laws of Nature as moral laws, but rather as theorems or conclusions of reason. That is, Hobbes believes that following these laws gives each person the best chance of preserving his or her own life. This, however, seems to lead into a different problem. The fundamental Law of Nature tells us it is rational to seek peace.
But Hobbes has already argued that the state of nature will be a state of war, because it is rational, in the state of nature, to invade others. How can Hobbes say that rationality requires both war and peace? The answer, I think, is that we have to distinguish between individual and collective rationality.
Collective rationality is what is best for each individual, on the assumption that everyone else will act the same way. The Laws of Nature express what is collectively rational. We can illustrate this distinction with an example from Jean-Paul Sartre. One by one they realize that they could increase the usable part of their plot by cutting down their trees and growing more crops. So they all cut down their trees. But in the next heavy storm the rain washes the soil off the hill, ruining the land.
Here we can say that the individually rational thing for each peasant is to cut down his or her trees, to increase the amount of land available for farming.
Cutting down the trees on just one plot will not make any significant difference to soil erosion. But collectively this is a disaster, for if they all cut down their trees everyone's farm will be ruined.
So the collectively rational thing to do is leave most, if not all, of the trees standing. The interesting feature of cases of this nature known in the literature as the 'prisoners' dilemma' is that, where individual and collective rationality diverge, it is very hard to achieve co-operation on the collectively rational outcome.
Every individual has an incentive to 'defect' in favour of the individually rational behaviour. Suppose the peasants understand the structure of their situation, and so agree to refrain from cutting down trees. Then any given peasant can reason that he or she will personally increase yield by felling trees remember that clearing just one plot will not lead to significant soil erosion. But what is true for one is true for all, and so they may each begin to clear their plots, to gain an individual advantage.
Even if they make an agreement, everyone has good reason to break that agreement. Unique among books of this kind is a sustained treatment of specifically social philosophy, including topics such as epistemic injustice, pornography, marriage, sexuality, and the family. The relation between such social questions and specifically political topics is discussed. These topics include: political authority, economic justice, the limits of tolerance, considerations of community, race, gender, and culture in questions of justice, and radical critiques of current political theories.?
Updates to the Second Edition emphasize the non-statist areas of the subject and include two brand new chapters on social philosophy and transnational justice. This Second Edition also includes revisions throughout and coverage of recent theoretical discussions and world events. It discusses historical and contemporary figures and covers a vast range of topics and debates, including immigration, war, national and global economics, the ethical and political implications of climate change, and the persistence of racial oppression and injustice.
It also presents accessible, non-technical discussions of perfectionism, utilitarianism, theories of the social contract, and the Marxian tradition of social criticism.
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